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ETHNIC CONFLICT: AN 
ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Victor Asal & Jonathan Wilkenfeld* 
INTRODUCTION 
To talk about the behavior of others is to generalize1 
especially if that behavior is perceived to be negative.2 As researchers 
who have studied ethnic discrimination and ethnic conflict for close 
to two decades, we have noticed, anecdotally at least, that this 
penchant for generalization is rampant in discussions of ethnic 
politics. Newspapers are not the only forum in which one will find 
articles that talk about one or another ethnic group’s involvement in 
violence without specifying a political organizational agent—by 
which we mean groups with a set of political goals along with an 
organizational structure. If an organization is mentioned, the article 
often offers a generalization about the use of violence or the 
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Affairs & Policy, University at Albany, State University of New York; and Jonathan 
Wilkenfeld is a Professor of Government and Politics and Director of the ICONS 
Project at the University of Maryland. Support for this research was provided by 
the National Science Foundation through Award #0826886 and by the Science and 
Technology Directorate of the United States Department of Homeland Security 
(grant number 2008ST061ST0004) through the National Consortium for the Study 
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). All views expressed in this 
article are those of the authors and not of the agencies supporting the research. 
  1 See generally Eric Hoyle, The Professionalization of Teachers: A Paradox, 30 
BRIT. J. EDUC. STUD. 161 (1982). 
  2 See generally Wouter Vanhouche & Joseph W. Alba, Generalizing from 
Negative Experiences, 26 INT’L J. RES. MARKETING 238 (2009). 
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behavior of an entire ethnic group based solely on the characteristics 
of one organization within that ethnic group. This problematic type 
of analysis is too often present in policy and academic journals as 
well. 
The problem of generalizing ethnic behavior becomes more 
pronounced when one examines the attribution of a particular 
behavior to a group over time. For example, take the statement that 
the “Kurds have always rebelled against Turkey,”3 which is 
problematic for many reasons since not all Kurds have ever rebelled 
—as many Kurds would tell you. Certain organizations that claim to 
represent the Kurds have rebelled for extended periods of time while 
others have not. Generalizations about the Palestinians provide a 
more extreme example: “Historical circumstances have changed over 
the years, but the Palestinians have always seemed to prefer the hopes of 
annihilating Israel in concert with Arab states, or the romance of 
violent struggle, to constructive accommodation”4 (emphasis added). 
Is this the desire of some Palestinians? Yes, disturbingly so, as some 
surveys suggest.5 Is this the desire of all Palestinians? No, and polls 
continuously provide evidence that this is not the case. For example, 
consider the polls from the Oslo process where “monthly CPRS polls 
show an increase in general public support for the ‘peace camp,’ from 
thirty-nine percent in January 1994 to fifty-five percent in October 
1995.”6 
This kind of generalization is a serious obstacle to 
understanding conflicts and identifying solutions because it prevents 
policymakers and academics from getting at the messy reality of 
ethnic politics—especially when they become contentious or violent. 
Generalizations are even more problematic when the goal is to 
identify the implications of different policies. Although the Kurds, 
                                                 
  3 Dilara Sezgin & Melissa A. Wall, Constructing the Kurds in the Turkish 
Press: A Case Study of Hürriyet Newspaper, 27 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y 787, 788 
(2005). 
  4 Saul Smilansky, Terrorism, Justification, and Illusion, 114 ETHICS 790, 796 
(2004). 
  5 See generally Stuart J. Kaufman, Narratives and Symbols in Violent 
Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case, 18 SEC. STUD. 400 (2009). 
  6 Khalil Shikaki, The Peace Process, National Reconstruction, and the 
Transition to Democracy in Palestine, 25 J. PALESTINE STUD. 5, 7 (1996). 
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Palestinians, Druze and other ethnic groups each have a shared 
identity, “ethnic groups” do not make policy decisions and are not 
monolithic wholes. Rather, it is the individuals and organizations 
within the ethnic groups that initiate political behavior. Accordingly, 
we must recognize that organizations are much more flexible about 
the behaviors they are willing to embrace than generalizations permit. 
Using a dataset of 118 ethnopolitical organizations in the 
Middle East and North Africa spanning the period 1980-2004, this 
article analyzes the enormous variance in behavior among and 
between organizations claiming to represent the same ethnic group. It 
also will show how such organizations often change their policies and 
shift back and forth between violent and nonviolent strategies, 
occasionally adopting both at the same time. While this article does 
not focus on the larger question of which policies make organizations 
more likely to move in one direction or another, it illustrates the 
importance of avoiding over aggregation when studying contentious 
politics. In the process, this article provides a counter-balance to 
generally accepted wisdom concerning the relationship between 
ethnicity and conflict. 
I. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR CAN CHANGE: 
THE MAROB DATASET 
            The Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) 
dataset7 examines organizations that represent Minorities at Risk 
groups.8 The 118 organizations included in the MAROB dataset 
include twenty two ethnopolitical groups in sixteen countries of the 
Middle East and North Africa, operating between 1980 and 2004.9 
                                                 
  7 Victor Asal, Amy Pate & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Minorities at Risk 
Organizational Behavior Data and Codebook, MINORITIES AT RISK PROJECT (Sept. 
2008),  http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data/marob/me_marob_sept08_code 
book.pdf.  
  8 Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 
Minorities at Risk Dataset, MINORITIES AT RISK PROJECT (Nov. 2010),  
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp.   
  9 Data collection is currently underway on the Terrorism and 
Extremist Organizations (TEO) Database, which will update much of the MAROB 
Middle East dataset through 2010. Victor Asal, R. Karl Rethemeyer & Jonathan 
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To be included in the dataset, the organization must not have been 
created by a government, must claim to represent an ethnic group, 
must be active at least at the regional level and exist for at least three 
years.10 Table 1 provides a breakdown from 2004 of the number of 
Middle Eastern and Northern African organizations in the dataset by 
ethnic group.11 
Table 1. Organizations in the MAROB Dataset 
in 2004 by Ethnic Group 
 
  Highly different organizations frequently claim to represent 
the same ethnic group. Table 2 lists two ethnic groups, Kurds in 
Turkey and Palestinians in Jordan, and a sample of the organizations 
                                                 
Wilkenfeld, Terrorist and Extremist Organizations (2012) (data collection will be 
completed by 2015). 
  10 See Asal et al., supra note 7. 
  11 Other contributions to this issue of the Penn State Journal of Law & 
International Affairs also focus on the challenges presented by multiple organizations’ 
participation in conflict and violence. See, e.g., David E. Cunningham, Who Should Be 
at the Table?: Veto Players and Peace Processes in Civil War, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 
38 (2013); J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature on the 
Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 48 (2013). 
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that claim to represent them. For example the Partiya Karkari 
Kurdistan, which claims to represent the Kurds, has used violence 
for every year in the dataset while the Halkin Emek Partisi and the 
Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulus Partisi never used violence during this 
time period. The same diverse strategic picture can be seen if we look 
at the Palestinian organizations in Jordan. The Jordanian People’s 
Democratic Party, which was a spinoff of the Democratic Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine, has not used violence since its founding 
in 1989, while the Black September Organization used violence for all 
but one year of its existence in Jordan between 1984 and 1988. To 
uniformly label the Kurdish or the Palestinian ethnic groups as 
violent represents a gross distortion of reality. 
Table 2. Examples of Minority at Risk Groups and MAROB 
Organizations 
Minority at Risk Group MAROB Organizations 
Kurds in Turkey 
Partiya Karkari Kurdistan (PKK) 
Halkin Emek Partisi 
Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulus Partisi 
Palestinians in Jordan 
Jordanian People’s Democratic Party 
Black September Organization 
 
           An examination of general behavior trends for the region over 
time reveals several observations about the ethnopolitical 
organizations claiming to represent MAR groups in the Middle East. 
First, a very large proportion of the organizations used violence in 
any given year (Table 3). That is, for an extended period of time 
more than twenty percent of the organizations in the dataset used 
violence in the same year, and in some years the number shot up past 
thirty percent. 
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Table 3. Strategies of Ethnopolitical Organizations 1980-2004 
 
           
 
Of course, organizations can engage in more than one activity 
at the same time. If terrorism is defined as the intentional targeting of 
civilians, then clearly Hamas is a terrorist organization. If insurgency 
is defined as an organization that shoots soldiers, then Hamas is not 
only a terrorist organization but also an insurgency. But as Table 4 
illustrates, Hamas is not solely a violent organization. It also spent 
some of its time involved in electoral politics, and by 1994 was active 
in education, propaganda and in providing social services. This is not 
to say that Hamas is not a terrorist organization but it does show that 
Hamas is complex and acts as more than just a terrorist organization. 
Understanding that Hamas has a larger presence is a starting point 
for gaining a better understanding of why part of the Palestinian 
public might have very strong concrete reasons for being loyal to 
Hamas beyond its policies as they relate to Israel. 
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Table 4. Political Behavior of Hamas, 1987-2004 
 
Year 
Attack 
Civilians 
Attack 
Security 
Forces 
Provide 
Social 
Services 
Education 
and 
Propaganda 
Involved in 
Electoral 
Politics 
1987 no no not used not used not used 
1988 no yes not used infrequent not used 
1989 yes yes unclear infrequent frequent 
1990 yes yes unclear infrequent not used 
1991 yes yes unclear frequent frequent 
1992 yes yes infrequent frequent infrequent 
1993 yes yes infrequent frequent infrequent 
1994 yes yes frequent frequent infrequent 
1995 yes yes frequent frequent infrequent 
1996 yes yes frequent frequent frequent 
1997 yes yes frequent frequent not used 
1998 yes yes frequent frequent not used 
1999 yes yes frequent frequent not used 
2000 yes yes frequent frequent not used 
2001 yes yes frequent frequent not used 
2002 yes yes frequent frequent not Used 
2003 yes yes frequent frequent not used 
2004 yes yes frequent frequent infrequent 
 
              Despite its other efforts, Hamas has clearly made a choice to 
embrace violence in general and target civilians specifically as a 
central part of its policy, as shown by the organization’s involvement 
in attacks against civilians every year since 1989. There is in this chart, 
though, a hint of the fact that organizations make choices about their 
strategies and that those choices can change or be influenced. In 1987 
Hamas did not use violence at all. In 1988 they moved into the realm 
of violent politics but the organization did not target civilians. 
Something happened in 1988 and the organization embraced the 
targeting of civilians. This change over three years suggests that 
organizations make strategic choices about violence and those 
choices can change over time. One might argue that it is not so 
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complicated and is simply an escalation of violence—but that 
reasoning would be a mistake. Terrorism is called the “weapon of the 
weak” not only because some people are trying to validate 
reprehensible behavior. Shooting a civilian without a weapon is a lot 
easier than shooting a soldier with one. As Martha Crenshaw so 
trenchantly pointed out: 
 
The observation that terrorism is a weapon of the 
weak is hackneyed but apt. At least when initially 
adopted, terrorism is the strategy of a minority that by 
its own judgment lacks other means. When the group 
perceives its options as limited, terrorism is attractive 
because it is a relatively inexpensive and simple 
alternative, and because its potential reward is high.12 
This remark suggests that Hamas’s move to begin attacking 
civilians was not simply an escalation but a choice about what it was 
willing to do, and a statement that it reached a point where 
intentionally killing unarmed civilians was acceptable; collateral 
damage is a different issue. If an organization chooses to move 
toward killing civilians, this suggests that an organization can choose 
to move away from such behavior as well.13 For example, Amal in 
Lebanon fits this category. Before 1989 Amal regularly engaged in 
terrorist tactics. From 1989 on, it did not engage in intentional 
attacks against civilians, but it continued to engage in attacks against 
military personnel during the entire time period. Some organizations 
flip back and forth on a regular basis. As Table 5 shows, the 
Palestinian Fatah Revolutionary Council based in Lebanon went back 
and forth repeatedly between using terrorist tactics to not using such 
tactics, to ending the use of violence entirely, to then going back to 
its use. 
  
                                                 
  12 Martha Crenshaw, The Causes of Terrorism, 13 COMP. POL. 379, 387 
(1981). 
  13 For a discussion of Hamas as well as other extremist organizations 
use of mixed tactics (violent and non-violent), see Kristine Höglund, Tactics in 
Negotiations between States and Extremists: The Role of Cease-Fires and Counterterrorist 
Measures, in ENGAGING EXTREMISTS: TRADE-OFFS, TIMING, AND DIPLOMACY, 
221, 236-39 (I. William Zartman & Guy Olivier Faure eds., 2011). 
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Table 5. Violent Behavior of the  
Fatah Revolutionary Council Based in Lebanon 
 
 
Year Civilian Security 
1980 0 0 
1981 0 0 
1982 1 0 
1983 0 0 
1984 1 0 
1985 1 0 
1986 1 0 
1987 1 0 
1988 1 1 
1989 1 1 
1990 0 1 
1991 1 1 
1992 0 1 
1993 0 1 
1994 0 0 
1995 0 0 
1996 0 0 
1997 0 0 
1998 0 0 
1999 0 0 
2000 0 0 
2001 0 0 
2002 0 1 
2003 0 0 
2004 0 0 
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II. STATE BEHAVIOR CAN CHANGE TOO 
These case studies suggest that generalizing about an ethnic 
group is a mistake and a potentially serious one, and that we need to 
be open to the possibility of change even at the organizational level. 
The same is true for the behavior of the state toward an organization.  
Table 6 provides yearly observations of Israel’s behavior toward 
Fatah in the West Bank and Gaza and Fatah’s behavior in the West 
Bank and Gaza as it relates to attacks against civilians and security 
forces from the beginning of the Oslo process in 1993 to 2004. This 
table illustrates how state and organizational behavior can change and 
strongly suggests the possibility of a delayed feedback between the 
behavior of one actor and the behavior of the other actor. 
 
Table 6. Select Years for Israel and Fatah  
Negotiation and Violence  
from the Beginning of the Oslo Process until 2004 
 
Year 
Negotiation 
Between  
Fatah and Israel 
Israel’s Attacks 
on Fatah 
Fatah Attacks 
on Civilians 
Fatah Attacks 
on Security 
Forces 
1993 some concessions yes yes yes 
1994 some concessions yes yes yes 
1995 some concessions yes yes yes 
1996 negotiation no no yes 
1997 some concessions no no no 
1998 some concessions no no yes 
1999 some concessions no no no 
2000 negotiation yes yes yes 
2001 negotiation yes yes yes 
2002 no negotiation yes yes yes 
2003 negotiation yes yes yes 
2004 no negotiation yes yes yes 
 
Organizations clearly choose from a menu of various 
strategies but they rarely choose or commit to one strategy alone. 
Many organizations in the Middle East will often switch between 
violent and nonviolent contentious strategies as well as traditional 
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political activity. Moreover, the choice of strategies can be impacted 
by the type of regime and the behavior of the government as well as 
by the ideologies of the organizations themselves. 
 
III. GENERALIZATION LEADS TO BAD POLICY—AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL DATA CAN HELP GROUND ANALYSIS 
 
Policymakers need to realize that the structure of the 
government and the way governments treat organizations and the 
populations they claim to represent will often have a direct impact on 
how those organizations behave. This brief overview examining 
examples of Middle Eastern ethnopolitical organizations is of equal 
importance, as it highlights the importance of disaggregating the 
behavior of organizations from the groups they claim to represent 
and the importance of not assuming that what is now true in terms of 
an organization’s behavior was always true—or always will be. The 
MAROB data allows us to underline the importance of specificity in 
policy making and the need to check general assumptions. It also 
facilitates analysis that can allow policymakers to get a handle on the 
various factors that will impact outcomes not just based on one case 
or anecdotal evidence, but on data that can be used to accept or 
reject our own assumptions.14 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Ethnopolitical organizational behavior in the Middle East is 
complex, and our ability to understand such behavior and identify the 
right policy choices is often ill-served by generalizations expounded 
by scholars and journalists. Often multiple organizations claim to 
represent the same ethnic group, and while some will engage in 
violence and even terrorism to achieve their goals, others will persist 
in more traditional avenues for addressing grievances such as 
electoral politics (and arguably, this is something to be encouraged). 
Furthermore, organizations will change their tactics over time, or 
                                                 
  14 See generally, e.g., Victor Asal, Richard Legault, Ora Szekely & 
Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Gender Ideologies and Forms of Contentious Mobilization in Middle 
East, J. PEACE RES. (forthcoming 2013); Victor Asal, Mitchell Brown & Angela 
Dalton, Why Split? Organizational Splits among Ethnopolitical Organizations in the Middle 
East, 56 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 94 (2012). 
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adopt more than one tactic at the same time. While ethnopolitical 
violence is a continuing problem as the headlines from Iraq, Israel 
and various other countries in the Middle East illustrate all too often, 
our ability to understand and address these problems are hampered 
by over aggregation and simplification. The international 
community’s ability to better understand ongoing conflicts and the 
potential avenues for solutions would be best served by taking a 
more nuanced and rigorous approach to collecting and analyzing data 
at the organizational level where important distinctions between 
organizations can be identified and key shifts in tactics can be 
followed and thus encouraged or discouraged. 
 
